Modern reproductive medicine is particularly affected by rapid technological change and high consumer expectation. The medicalisation of human reproduction has given doctors control over contraception and abortion and more recently over artificial procreation through reproductive technology. In addition, advances in preconception and prenatal testing, together with the relentless march of genetic knowledge, continue to pose more and increasingly complex ethical dilemmas. These developments place a greater ethical and legal onus on doctors to avoid causing harm through human and mechanical error. Furthermore, while the availability of preconception and prenatal screening provides women with more reproductive choice, the resulting information adds a further dimension to the meaning of reproductive choice. Access to safe and legal abortion is an implicit part of the testing/screening procedures and, therefore, the right of parents to proceed with a pregnancy must be respected and protected where there are indications of fetal abnormality or potential disorders in later life.
NSWLR 47' shows how judicial confusion about the legality of abortion can result in judges condoning medical negligence. The Superclinics case also suggests that doctors are not required to provide pregnant women with the same standard of care as other patients. These developments show that law can become incoherent and health professionals can act negligently with impunity when reproductive choice does not have a secure legal foundation.
Modern reproductive medicine is particularly affected by rapid technological change and high consumer expectation. The medicalisation of human reproduction has given doctors control over contraception and abortion and more recently over artificial procreation through reproductive technology. In addition, advances in preconception and prenatal testing, together with the relentless march of genetic knowledge, continue to pose more and increasingly complex ethical dilemmas. These developments place a greater ethical and legal onus on doctors to avoid causing harm through human and mechanical error. Furthermore, while the availability of preconception and prenatal screening provides women with more reproductive choice, the resulting information adds a further dimension to the meaning of reproductive choice. Access to safe and legal abortion is an implicit part of the testing/screening procedures and, therefore, the right of parents to proceed with a pregnancy must be respected and protected where (UK) makes specific provision for lawful medical abortion. The "social" clause permits abortions to be performed for therapeutic and social reasons up to 24 weeks and the remaining grounds which deal with more serious indications are now free of gestational limitations. In Rance v Mid-Downs Health Authority,6 which was decided before the Abortion Act was amended in 1990, hospital staff failed to detect fetal abnormality when conducting prenatal tests and the child was born with spina bifida. The wrongful birth claim failed mainly because of problems with causation but also because the fetus would have been "capable of being born alive" under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (UK) when the hypothetical abortion would have taken place. The possibility of an English court treating a hypothetical abortion as unlawful still exists because abortion is prima facie a criminal offence. The legislation merely provides defences to a criminal act if the statutory conditions are satisfied. Nevertheless, the legislation tends to be interpreted liberally.
Material risks
There have only been a few wrongful birth cases in Australia7 and the action is relatively novel. As well as deciding that medical practice does not constitute a legal standard, the ruling in Rogers v Whitaker,3 referred to at the beginning of this article, also found that a doctor has a duty of care to warn a patient of material risks, particularly the risks that a reasonable doctor would disclose, or risks which the doctor could reasonably be expected to know would be significant for the patient. This 
Medical neglect
The vulnerability of the law underpinning the abortion delivery system was graphically exposed because of medical neglect. The woman plaintiff in CES v Superclinics was a young student who went to the medical clinic, Superclinics, after missing her menstrual period. She was extremely concerned about the possibility of being pregnant as she was in an unstable relationship and had very limited means of support. After an unbelievable number of misdiagnoses, this young woman was eventually diagnosed as being pregnant at 19-5 weeks gestation and was advised it was too late to have an abortion. She gave birth to a healthy child and sued Superclinics and the medical practitioners for wrongful birth, alleging they had deprived her of the opportunity to discover her pregnancy in time to have an abortion. The child was born because of the defendant's negligence and the courts accepted that if the health professionals employed by Superclinics had acted competently the woman would have had a safe abortion early in the pregnancy. She would not have lost the opportunity to choose whether or not to continue with the pregnancy.
The trial judge in CES v Superclinics'4 accepted that there was a breach of the duty of care and the defendants had acted negligently. He also accepted that the plaintiff would have succeeded in securing an abortion if she had sought one early in the pregnancy. Nevertheless, he denied her claim for damages on the ground that she had lost the opportunity to perform an illegal act under the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), finding that her health was excellent at all times and that the pregnancy did not present a serious danger to her mental health. Ignoring the culpable behaviour of the defendants plus the social context, whereby state-subsidised abortions are freely and openly available in Sydney, he drew an analogy between a woman seeking an abortion in these circumstances and an unsuccessful bank robber claiming damages against a third party who unintentionally thwarted the robbers from executing their deed. Effectively Newman J sanctioned the defendants' medical misconduct.
The New South Wales Court of Appeal in CES v Superclinics, (Kirby A C-J and Priestley JA; and Meagher JA dissenting) overruled the Supreme Court decision. Kirby A C-J found that a hypothetical abortion would not necessarily have been unlawful. Priestley JA agreed that a termination would not be deemed unlawful unless and until a court ruled it to be so. However, Meagher JA (in dissent) decided that a medical practitioner could not have honestly believed on reasonable grounds that a hypothetical abortion in these circumstances would have been lawful. The appeal court ordered a retrial to consider the question of damages. Furthermore, special leave to appeal to the high court of Australia was granted to the defendant doctors and medical clinic; leave was also granted to the Roman Catholic Church to join the proceedings. However, the matter was settled out of court on 10th October 1996.
In his judgment Kirby A C-J observed that abortion practice is a social reality which cannot be ignored and that doctors acting negligently must be accountable for their behaviour. He said: strongly worded and intellectually analytical judgment Kirby A C-J takes the view that abortion in the common law states is not a prima facie offence and the loss of opportunity to perform an illegal act was not a relevant consideration in this wrongful conception action. Kirby A C-J rejected the analogy of the bank robber and preferred the approach adopted by de Jersey J in the Queensland case Veivers v Connolley.'6 In this case, damages were awarded to the plaintiff whose child was born severely disabled after the mother contracted rubella early in the pregnancy. The court found that the medical practitioner was negligent in failing to diagnose the condition and that a correct diagnosis would have led to a recommendation for an abortion in view of the risks to the fetus. Mrs Veivers made it very clear that she would have had an abortion if she had been given the opportunity. Nevertheless, because of the remote possibility that the abortion would have been illegal de Jersey J reduced the damages by five per cent. Although this approach is flawed from the point of view of reproductive choice, CES v Superclinics suggests it is probably better than leaving individual judges to interpret the law.
The New South Wales Court of Appeal has upheld Davidson and Wald but the divergent judicial approaches means that the common law is still uncertain and according to Priestley JA unpredictable. Furthermore, Kirby A C-J's judgment is extremely important not only because it is the most analytical of the three but also because it stands for the proposition that in spite of the criminal statutes abortion is not intrinsically an unlawful act.`7
The CES v Superclinics case clearly demonstrates how negligent defendant health professionals can raise the defence of illegality in a wrongful birth case when abortion laws are unclear and how plaintiffs are at risk of being denied compensation even when a court finds that the case for medical negligence has been established. The present situation forces litigants to take the possibility of the court declaring a hypothetical abortion illegal into account when weighing up the pros and cons of seeking redress for medical misconduct. Finally, another disturbing aspect of the supreme court trial decision in CES v Superclinics is that it suggests that the law does not require doctors to provide pregnant women with the same standard of care as other patients. This is clearly untenable from both an ethical and legal perspective.
